Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly exhibit anthropomorphism characteristics -- human-like qualities portrayed across their outlook, language, behavior, and reasoning functions. Such characteristics enable more intuitive and engaging human-AI interactions. However, current research on anthropomorphism remains predominantly risk-focused, emphasizing over-trust and user deception while offering limited design guidance. We argue that anthropomorphism should instead be treated as a concept of design that can be intentionally tuned to support user goals. Drawing from multiple disciplines, we propose that the anthropomorphism of an LLM-based artifact should reflect the interaction between artifact designers and interpreters. This interaction is facilitated by cues embedded in the artifact by the designers and the (cognitive) responses of the interpreters to the cues. Cues are categorized into four dimensions: perceptive, linguistic, behavioral, and cognitive. By analyzing the manifestation and effectiveness of each cue, we provide a unified taxonomy with actionable levers for practitioners. Consequently, we advocate for function-oriented evaluations of anthropomorphic design.

Anthropomorphism, or the attribution of human traits to technology, is an automatic and unconscious response that occurs even in those with advanced technical expertise. In this position paper, we analyze hundreds of thousands of research articles to present empirical evidence of the prevalence and growth of anthropomorphic terminology in research on large language models (LLMs). We argue for challenging the deeper assumptions reflected in this terminology -- which, though often useful, may inadvertently constrain LLM development -- and broadening beyond them to open new pathways for understanding and improving LLMs. Specifically, we identify and examine five anthropomorphic assumptions that shape research across the LLM development lifecycle. For each assumption (e.g., that LLMs must use natural language for reasoning, or that they should be evaluated on benchmarks originally meant for humans), we demonstrate empirical, non-anthropomorphic alternatives that remain under-explored yet offer promising directions for LLM research and development.

LLMorphism is the biased belief that human cognition works like a large language model. I argue that the rise of conversational LLMs may make this bias increasingly psychologically available. When artificial systems produce human-like language, people may draw a reverse inference: if LLMs can speak like humans, perhaps humans think like LLMs. This inference is biased because similarity at the level of linguistic output does not imply similarity in cognitive architecture. Yet, LLMorphism may spread through two mechanisms: analogical transfer, whereby features of LLMs are projected onto humans, and metaphorical availability, whereby LLM vocabulary becomes a culturally salient vocabulary for describing thought. I distinguish LLMorphism from mechanomorphism, anthropomorphism, computationalism, dehumanization, objectification, and predictive-processing theories of mind. I outline its implications for work, education, responsibility, healthcare, communication, creativity, and human dignity, while also discussing boundary conditions and forms of resistance. I conclude that the public debate may be missing half of the problem: the issue is not only whether we are attributing too much mind to machines, but also whether we are beginning to attribute too little mind to humans.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) further improves the capabilities of open-domain dialogue systems and can generate fluent, coherent, and diverse responses. However, LLMs still lack a crucial ability: communication skills. This limitation renders them more like information seeking tools rather than anthropomorphic chatbots. Communication skills, such as topic transition, proactively asking questions, concept guidance, empathy, and summarising often should be taken into consideration, to make LLMs more anthropomorphic and proactive during the conversation, thereby increasing the interest of users and attracting them to chat for longer. However, enabling these communication skills in black-box LLMs remains a key challenge because they do not have the same utterance formation mode as real people: think before speaking. Inspired by linguistics and cognitive science, we empower LLMs with communication skills through inner monologues. To evaluate various communication skills, we construct a benchmark named Cskills, which can also more comprehensively evaluate the dialogue generation ability of the model. Experimental results show that the proposed CSIM strategy improves the backbone models and outperforms the baselines.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

One of the long-standing aspirations in conversational AI is to allow them to autonomously take initiatives in conversations, i.e., being proactive. This is especially challenging for multi-party conversations. Prior NLP research focused mainly on predicting the next speaker from contexts like preceding conversations. In this paper, we demonstrate the limitations of such methods and rethink what it means for AI to be proactive in multi-party, human-AI conversations. We propose that just like humans, rather than merely reacting to turn-taking cues, a proactive AI formulates its own inner thoughts during a conversation, and seeks the right moment to contribute. Through a formative study with 24 participants and inspiration from linguistics and cognitive psychology, we introduce the Inner Thoughts framework. Our framework equips AI with a continuous, covert train of thoughts in parallel to the overt communication process, which enables it to proactively engage by modeling its intrinsic motivation to express these thoughts. We instantiated this framework into two real-time systems: an AI playground web app and a chatbot. Through a technical evaluation and user studies with human participants, our framework significantly surpasses existing baselines on aspects like anthropomorphism, coherence, intelligence, and turn-taking appropriateness.

We introduce DarkBench, a comprehensive benchmark for detecting dark design patterns--manipulative techniques that influence user behavior--in interactions with large language models (LLMs). Our benchmark comprises 660 prompts across six categories: brand bias, user retention, sycophancy, anthropomorphism, harmful generation, and sneaking. We evaluate models from five leading companies (OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta, Mistral, Google) and find that some LLMs are explicitly designed to favor their developers' products and exhibit untruthful communication, among other manipulative behaviors. Companies developing LLMs should recognize and mitigate the impact of dark design patterns to promote more ethical AI.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated unprecedented capabilities across various natural language processing tasks. Their ability to process and generate viable text and code has made them ubiquitous in many fields, while their deployment as knowledge bases and "reasoning" tools remains an area of ongoing research. In geography, a growing body of literature has been focusing on evaluating LLMs' geographical knowledge and their ability to perform spatial reasoning. However, very little is still known about the internal functioning of these models, especially about how they process geographical information. In this chapter, we establish a novel framework for the study of geospatial mechanistic interpretability - using spatial analysis to reverse engineer how LLMs handle geographical information. Our aim is to advance our understanding of the internal representations that these complex models generate while processing geographical information - what one might call "how LLMs think about geographic information" if such phrasing was not an undue anthropomorphism. We first outline the use of probing in revealing internal structures within LLMs. We then introduce the field of mechanistic interpretability, discussing the superposition hypothesis and the role of sparse autoencoders in disentangling polysemantic internal representations of LLMs into more interpretable, monosemantic features. In our experiments, we use spatial autocorrelation to show how features obtained for placenames display spatial patterns related to their geographic location and can thus be interpreted geospatially, providing insights into how these models process geographical information. We conclude by discussing how our framework can help shape the study and use of foundation models in geography.

As dialogue agents become increasingly human-like in their performance, it is imperative that we develop effective ways to describe their behaviour in high-level terms without falling into the trap of anthropomorphism. In this paper, we foreground the concept of role-play. Casting dialogue agent behaviour in terms of role-play allows us to draw on familiar folk psychological terms, without ascribing human characteristics to language models they in fact lack. Two important cases of dialogue agent behaviour are addressed this way, namely (apparent) deception and (apparent) self-awareness.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards without human-annotated data, often referred to as zero RL, has emerged as a powerful paradigm for eliciting chain-of-thought reasoning. However, due to computational constraints, existing studies are largely restricted to small models, leaving the training dynamics and emergent capabilities at a large scale unexplored. To meaningfully explore this frontier, we aim to elicit high-quality reasoning behaviors from the model. However, we find that naive scaling often suffers from poor readability, token redundancy, and a lack of adaptive reasoning depth. To address these challenges, we present a stable and efficient training pipeline, incorporating algorithmic and system optimizations such as clipped importance sampling, training-inference ratio correction, and mixed-precision control. Our experiments offer three key findings that validate the "bitter lesson" of scaling: (1) scaling to 1T parameters significantly enhances sample efficiency and performance ceilings; (2) the training process progresses sequentially through an initial discovery phase followed by a sharpening phase; and (3) the model spontaneously develops advanced cognitive behaviors, including anthropomorphism, structured formatting, self-verification, parallel reasoning, and context anxiety, rendering hand-crafted heuristics redundant. Evaluated on seven mathematical benchmarks, Ring-2.5-1T-Zero achieves competitive performance. Additionally, to assess CoT quality beyond final-answer correctness, we propose a structured evaluation framework across three dimensions: comprehensibility, reproducibility, and efficiency, where our model demonstrates clear advantages in producing structured and concise reasoning traces. By sharing our observed emergent phenomena, we hope to provide the community with deeper insights into scaling behaviors, particularly at the 1-trillion scale.